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Participation has undergone a communicative shift, which has favoured the organization
of new participatory processes based on classic principles of deliberation theory. These
experiments go beyond traditional protest: they include a communicative element with
the aim of defining a public politics, which places them alongside models of deliberative
governance. The present work sets out the characteristics of these new instruments
(participatory budgeting, PB) in order to find out which problems deliberative governance
initiatives are faced with. The conclusions tell us that the inequalities in participation are
significant. Nevertheless, PB enables most participants to make effective use of their
opportunities for deliberation. From this standpoint, the challenge for deliberative
governance does not seem to be the deliberative capabilities of individuals, but rather
the design of participatory procedures and the participation of individuals. We may
question whether the administration can guarantee impartial political spaces that
are as inclusive as possible.
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Towards deliberative governance
In recent years, the theory of democracy has undergone a shift towards the theory
of deliberation (Manin, 1987; Bohman, 1998; Dryzek, 2000). This shift reflects
the growing importance of communication in politics, moving away from
authoritarian codes, and opening legitimization processes based on deliberation,
accommodation, or mutual influence (Habermas, 1996; Knight and Johnson,
1997). However, above all, it has meant the incorporation of individuals in pol-
itics as competent rational agents who think about their preferences in the light of
open debate (Chambers, 2003). Parallel to the communicative shift in the theory
of democracy, participatory theory has undergone a similar shift, at least for its
practitioners. Little more than a decade ago, a representative sample of European
countries broadened the conception of participation, advocating deliberative
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governance for safeguarding administrative modernization (Stoker, 2003;
Smith, 2009; Sintomer et al., 2011). This new conception is rooted in the search
for a more horizontal and cooperative political organization (Papadopoulos,
2003). Think of the legislative changes carried out in the United Kingdom (Local
Government Act 2000), France (Proximity Democracy Law 2002), Spain (Local
Government Modernisation Law 2003), Holland (Local Democracy Law 2002),
or the recommendations made in this respect by the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe (2001) or the OECD (2001). All of these reforms sought to
increase the transparency of public management in order to enhance democratic
legitimacy, by (1) improving accountability, which seeks to make executive
responsibility more transparent and (2) increasing participatory processes. The
effect of this has been the proliferation of new participatory instruments in France
(Sintomer and Maillard, 2007), in the United Kingdom (Birch, 2002), Spain (Ganuza
and France´s, 2011), and many other countries (Smith, 2009), with a substantial
deliberative format, very different from prior participatory instruments (Sintomer
et al., 2011).
These new institutional arrangements have been called Empowered Participatory
Governance by Fung and Wright (2003: 5). Legislative reforms such as those
mentioned above promote the deliberative role of the administration, favouring
institutional arrangements that encourage elites to enter into dialogue with the
public in the period between elections. Through these instruments, the adminis-
tration aims at a deliberative process targeted at collectively defining policy
content. The new instruments take social mobilization as far as formulating
proposals. Here participation entails moving beyond the traditional definition and
incorporating elements of deliberative theory. It is not a case of lobbying for a
particular interest, but of establishing a dialogue throughout the spectrum of
interests. The relation between those who govern and those who are governed
thus becomes more horizontal, as Sintomer et al., (2011: 15) suggests in his study
on participatory budgets. This feature takes participation into an arena where the
involvement of differences in the debate becomes important and emphasizes that
all participants can avail themselves of language on an equal footing. Studies in
Brazil on participatory budgets suggest that these cannot be justified solely by
neo-Toquevillian theories, but have an institutional dimension – what Avritzer
(2006: 630) calls the effectiveness of deliberative process. The crucial variable is a
deliberative process in which the public may directly influence public policies.
Baiocchi (2005: 144) and Wampler (2007) point out how important local insti-
tutional conditions are in explaining these experiences and their quality, which is
expressed (1) in administrative efficiency (carrying out proposals debated by the
citizens) and (2) in the pluralistic inclusion of citizens (participation that reflects
the population and an equitable distribution of the opportunities available for
influencing and deliberating).
The aim of this article was to analyse to what extent these new instruments,
mainly participatory budgeting (PB), deal with two important issues in deliberative
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governance: (a) the inclusiveness and diversity of opinions (Knight and Johnson,
1994; Dryzek, 2000) and (b) the allocation of deliberative opportunities (Bohman,
1997). We shall analyse the profiles of participants mobilized to attend public
meetings on PB and, finally, of those mobilized to deliberate within public meetings in
which different citizens may participate under equal conditions in a public debate.
We will thus analyse deliberative performance in PB. Most studies of PB have been
carried out in Brazilian cities, this study extends the topic by studying participatory
budgets in Spain.
The article is divided into four sections. In the first, we describe the theoretical
problems linked to deliberative governance. Second, we show how the PB pro-
cesses we analyse operate, describing the participatory budgets in Brazil and Spain
in more detail, and setting out our hypothesis and methodology. Third, we analyse
the results of a survey of participants in public meetings held in Spain to examine the
profiles of the participants mobilized and the level of deliberation achieved in the
public meetings. Finally, we conclude with reflections on the problem of deliberative
governance in light of the results obtained in a specific participatory experiment.
The problem of inclusion and deliberation in deliberative governance
The idea of political empowerment is central to deliberative governance.
Empowering individuals generally means increasing their capacity to participate
in, and share responsibility for, public affairs. One challenge for deliberative
governance is to address the problem of inclusion (who can participate) and to
what extent individuals may develop deliberative skills and capabilities. The new
participatory instruments that have spread throughout the world (Smith, 2009)
challenge traditional participatory procedures. This is not only because they rest
on a different logic (deliberation), but also because they give governments a
privileged place in the organization of participatory processes, which becomes
even more pronounced if we consider inclusion and the deliberative performance
of those who participate. The new participatory procedures, then, raise many
questions, which we sum up in terms of two problems: (1) the opposition that has
often been cited between participation and deliberation and (2) the factors that
really prevent the conditions of access to public debate becoming universal.
(1) Participation has always been explained (Verba and Nie, 1972: 2; Brady,
1999: 737; Teorell et al., 2007: 336) as a preference aggregation mechanism,
enabling individuals to organize themselves with respect to their particular interests,
to indirectly influence decision makers (Papadopoulos and Warin, 2007: 451). This
scenario embraces participation as an act of protest and relies on the image of a
society fragmented into disparate interests. Here, negotiation is given priority as a
mechanism whereby citizens’ preferences are parlayed into public politics.
From this perspective, participation has been seen by many authors in contrast
to deliberation. Both may have the aim of improving the legitimacy of the govern-
ment, but by different means. The theory of deliberation emphasizes the process
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whereby preferences are formed and described, whereas participatory theory pays
more attention to including the broadest categories of citizens (Papadopoulos and
Warin, 2007: 450). Criticisms of each theory stress, above all, the exclusive limits of
their own dynamics. Fiorina (1999), for example, sets out what a participatory
activist’s profile requires, which could be a significant obstacle to involvement by the
average citizen. Sanders (1997), on the other hand, shows the underlying requirement
of rationality that is unequally distributed throughout society. Mutz (2006) suggests
that participatory logic based on attaining predetermined objectives does not fit very
well with deliberative logic based on dialogue between people who differ in their
thinking. This dialogue, which allows an individual to make contact with viewpoints
different to her own, would not be a characteristic feature of those who are active in a
participatory way, as they are focused on their own interests and form part of rather
homogeneous social networks (Mutz, 2006: 20–50).
The differences between the dynamics at work in participatory and deliberative
processes have been highlighted by studying associations. Eliasoph (1998) showed
how active members of voluntary organizations in the United States of America
avoided speaking about politics and therefore avoided a dialogue between dif-
ferent viewpoints. Hendriks (2002), in her analysis of citizen juries in Australia,
shows the conflict existing between voluntary associations and a deliberative
procedure open to the general public. Rui and Villechaise-Dupont (2005) point
out a similar conflict between associations and deliberative procedures in France.
Such conflicts might lead us to understand that deliberation and participation,
despite sharing the same aim (increasing government legitimacy), possess competing
visions of democracy.
However, Papadopoulos and Warin (2007) minimize these differences. There is
less polarization between them than between participatory theories and elitist
theories, or between the theory of deliberation and standpoints that argue for an
aggregative theory of democracy. It must be taken into account that the analysis
of participation has been based mainly on studies of interest groups (Jordan and
Maloney, 1997; Eliasoph, 1998; Lichterman, 2006), whereas studies of delib-
eration have been extensively carried out on deliberative experiments (Fishkin,
1996; Smith and Wales, 2000; Barabas, 2004; Font and Blanco, 2007). Both
theories have also extensively analysed features that are supposedly shared by
individuals with one profile or another (Mutz, 2006; Maloney and Robteutscher,
2007). This may, in part, be because of the fact that there are no clear procedures
that lead participation and deliberation to converge, which in turn leads to the
processes becoming estranged from each other. We might think, as Eliasoph (1998)
suggests, that the problem is the way participation occurs in a determined public
space. Delli Carpini et al., (2004: 336) think the same about deliberative processes.
From this perspective, it is not only a question of abstract and universal character-
istics of participation or deliberation, but rather that these depend significantly on the
way participation (and deliberation) occurs. This would mean analysing both the
procedures and the space in which the deliberative and participatory dynamics
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are generated. We should take into account not only individual characteristics, but
also how the spaces are designed so that interaction may take place. From this
standpoint, participation and deliberation contain considerable differences; however,
participatory budgets offer an institutional design that allows the traditional parti-
cipatory profile to be incorporated into a deliberative dynamic, corroborating
Eliasoph’s (1998) context hypothesis. We therefore cannot pay attention only to the
universal characteristics of those who participate; it is also very important to consider
the space in which they do so. Wampler (2007) and Avritzer (2006) have already
pointed out that many differences between the experiences of PB in Brazil can be
explained by the different institutional contexts in which they take place.
(2) In a way, this means that it is possible for participatory processes to include
deliberation. Everything depends on how participation is organized; whether a
scenario of negotiation of interests or a deliberative scenario. In this sense, the
communicative feature of participation may have positive effects on the devel-
opment of democracy. It would involve taking deliberation out of a merely
experimental setting and projecting its effects onto participants (Thompson,
2008). It not only allows governments to be more accountable through delib-
eration, but can also take deliberation into participatory scenarios and include
individuals who do not usually participate, but who are willing to become
involved in a deliberative procedure.
The problem that emerges from this convergence, however, is how to ensure
plural and universal access to participatory and deliberative procedures. The
study will show the difficulties of organizing an impartial procedure, not so much
because it is impossible to imagine participants having the skills to take part in
public debate or being able to take proper advantage of their deliberative
opportunities, but rather because of the difficulties they encounter in becoming
involved in a participatory procedure. This indicates an obstacle for deliberative
governance – one that relates not to deliberation but to participation: how will it
be possible to organize participatory procedures or spaces that include a broad
social plurality?
PB is aimed at the public as a whole, but that does not necessarily mean that
everybody participates. Verba et al. (1995) show that when speaking about citizen
participation, three factors can explain involvement: (1) whether a person really
wanted to take part, (2) whether they could take part, because of material and
symbolic barriers, and (3) whether they were asked to take part. The last of the
above factors indicate how important it is that the public feel invited to take part.
I suggest that contact with somebody or something that provides the knowledge
and means to participate often precedes public involvement in politics. This is why
the analysis of public mobilization has become so important (Lim, 2010). Yet from
the perspective of deliberative governance, we should also take into account whether
citizens feel invited by their government. If citizens believe their government is biased,
they can reject participation. PB therefore faces a challenge, in that it is a way for
citizens to show confidence (or otherwise) in their government. Can governments
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offer an impartial participatory space to make citizen participation attractive? We
will try to answer these questions through the case of Spanish PB.
From Brazilian PB to Spanish experiences
Participatory budgets are organized with the aim of discussing a part of public
budgeting (Fedozzi, 2001; Baiocchi, 2003; Avritzer, 2006; Sintomer et al., 2011).
Such discussions take place in line with a procedure that is consultative in most
European instances (Sintomer et al., 2011) in contrast to Brazilian ones (Avritzer,
2006). In Spain, however, PB always presupposes a decision-making procedure
(Ganuza and France´s, 2011). Combining participation with a public process
of decision-making presents a problem of political legitimacy, as deliberative
theory asserts (Knight and Johnson, 1994; Christiano, 1997). On the one hand, a
procedure must be designed that allows the public to debate and decide part of the
public budget within an impartial setting that legitimates the decisions adopted;
on the other hand, a participatory process that is as inclusive as possible and
which can, in turn, legitimate decisions reflecting the engagement of diverse
publics in an open debate must be organized.
Public decision-making processes in most Brazilian instances have been orga-
nized on the basis of a multi-stage process in which decisions are adopted pro-
gressively. Deliberative and preference-averaged procedures are mixed to obtain a
measured decision. In this way, the process attempts to reduce the influence of
voting, including a deliberative procedure in which citizens not only bargain for
their interests, but must also evaluate the distribution of scarce resources in the
best possible way within the municipality. In almost all Brazilian participatory
budgets, this has included a process of deliberation based on applying criteria of
distributive justice. In some cases, the citizens, and in others the administration, or
sometimes both jointly, decide on criteria that will subsequently be used to
prioritize citizens’ proposals. It is a procedure that brings to mind Rawls’s veil of
ignorance. In this way, the results will be the fruit of a deliberative process and not
only a vote. This prevents snap decisions and means that priorities are considered
properly. This may also give rise to frustration, as there is never a direct decision-
making process. The process has several stages, and, in each, the preferences of
others must be considered.
Besides the decision-making process, PB seeks to include civic diversity, that is,
it legitimates by including heterogeneous citizens in the deliberative process. PB
differs from other processes of public deliberation in that citizens are not directly
invited to take part in the public debate. For example, in deliberative polls, par-
ticipants are selected by random sampling, whereas in juries, citizens are often
chosen by lottery. This fact makes the inclusion of the public a crucial problem in
all the experiences organized.
The institutional design of participatory budgets, which aims at the general
public, offers a participatory framework that differs from the usual protest model.
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In principle, the citizen’s role is not a skilled one. She only has to attend a public
meeting; if she wishes, she can talk and propose something, or just listen; at the
end she can vote. For most participants, involvement is sporadic, in contrast to
typical demands from participatory movements (Fiorina, 1999). The aim of
participation is also different. Here it seeks to make a collective decision in which
each participant is invited to influence public decisions. This breaks up the hier-
archical structures of corporate and protest groups (Jordan and Maloney, 1997;
Maloney and Robteutscher, 2007). The process provides spaces for people to
speak, and not only about their own preferences. Deliberation is an intrinsic part of
the process, and citizens are continually invited to engage in deliberation in open
public meetings. It is crucial to listen to others’ demands, and thus these experiences
differ from traditional participatory structures (pursuing one’s own interest) and are
closer to deliberative arrangements (considering different viewpoints).
In the European context, Spain is the country where PB has been most
experimented (Sintomer et al., 2011). The first experience was in 2001, in the city
of Cordoba, and has now expanded to more than 50 different cities all over the
country. Most PB experiences have been launched by left political parties; how-
ever, most experiences since 2007 have been launched by conservative political
parties. Both left and right political parties accept PB as a decision-making
process. The process is similar to the Brazilian one, as both experiences feature
a step-by-step decision-making process, in which criteria of redistributive justice
are applied in order to prioritize citizens’ proposals. This similarity allows us to
compare the Spanish and Brazilian experiences, as they face the same problems; a
collective decision-making process needs mechanisms that make open debate
possible and to include public heterogeneity.
The big difference between the two countries lies in the aims pursued. Although
in Brazil, PB is an instrument for achieving a more equitable distribution of public
funds, and also for democratization (Avritzer, 2006), in Spain, it has been mainly
a tool for modernizing the state by improving relations between those who govern
and those who are governed by increasing citizen engagement in public admin-
istration (Ganuza and France´s, 2011). Social justice has not been a central vari-
able in the expansion of PB in Spain, where PB is justified more as an instrument
to ‘improve democracy’. It is a chance to invite more citizens to participate and to
justify administrative decisions. In this sense, criteria of redistributive justice are a
transparent way to prioritize citizens’ proposals, rather than achieve equitable
allocations of public resources.
In Brazil, traditionally marginalized citizens who did not participate have
found a channel of participation in PB (Baiocchi, 2005; Wampler, 2007). The socio-
demographic structure in places such as Porto Alegre is very similar to the municipal
population’s structure (Sintomer and Gret, 2003). According to Baiocchi (1999)
deliberative opportunities are well-distributed among participants, a point on which
Avritzer (2006) confirms in studying other experiences in Brazil. However, Nylen
(2002) points out the importance of participatory background among the participants
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in Belo Horizonte and Betin, in that although new participants with low socio-
economic status are mobilized, they still have a classic participatory profile, as
many are members of associations. Nylen (2002), however, analyses participants
in PB councils, whereas Baiocchi (2005) and Fedozzi (2005), for example, analyse
participants in assemblies. Even so, this difference demonstrates how important
the traditional participant profile remains in these new arrangements.
We may wonder to what extent PB in Spain reproduces the results seen in
Brazil, and whether the Spanish have been able to incorporate new participants or
equitably distribute opportunities for influence. Considering these problems, our
first hypothesis is that in Spain, without a specific selection method (e.g. a lottery),
it is very likely that people who attend the new participatory spaces will be those
who already participated previously and, therefore, have an active citizen profile
(better educated, linked to associations, interested in politics, etc.). Our second
hypothesis is that if we consider a participatory space distinct from the traditional
world of protest and corporatism, even though it is occupied largely by traditional
protagonists, we may expect deliberation to be possible for all participants.
The survey
Our results are drawn from a survey carried out by the IESA (Institute of
Advanced Social Studies) in 2007 of eight participatory budgets. A total of 3094
people participated in the assemblies in eight municipalities. We asked them to fill
out the questionnaire after the assembly. We obtained 1139 participant ques-
tionnaires. The questionnaire used was expressly designed for this purpose. It is
structured and is arranged in a multi-topic format, where questions regarding the
deliberative role of participants are asked. There are also questions intended to
record the subject’s involvement in the participatory budget, and the perception of
the subjects of the political sphere.
The data-gathering process did not attempt to create a representative sample.
This premise was chosen because participants were not required to reflect the
demography of the municipality. Besides, the municipalities do not maintain a
participation database. The intention was to sample the population structure
mobilized in this process, for which there was no prior data that would allow us
to infer the population characteristics. The sample design followed an exploratory
logic, justified by the non-existence of precedents for surveys of this type, and the
absence of data on the socio-demographic structure of participants. Open quotas
were determined for gender and age for a non-probabilistic sampling, forming a
final sample with 1139 cases. The aim of the survey was therefore to attempt to
conduct a survey that would contain the largest possible number of citizens who
had participated in the assembly processes that year. The final response rate was
36.8% of the population (1139 people completed the questionnaire of a total
of 3094 people who attended the meetings in the different municipalities).
Thus, although the final size of the sample may not allow us to make statistical
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inferences, it does at least support the analysis of a very significant number of
cases in relation to the total number of subjects attending the assembly processes.
The survey was conducted with the express permission of the coordinators of
each experiment, and the implementation of the field study was standardized in all
municipalities: anonymous questionnaires, validated by pre-testing, and self-
administered with technical assistance from the personnel in charge of the processes.
In each municipality, the questionnaire was handed to all participants at the start of
the public meeting (always the meeting where the participants debated and decided
on proposals), and the aims of the research were briefly explained. At the end of the
meeting, the participants handed in the questionnaire to the organizers.
The problem of inclusion in Spanish experiences
The total participation of citizens in Spanish PB is between 1% and 3% of the
total population. This is very similar to the average participation we find, for
example, in the city of Porto Alegre – a global reference for PB (Fedozzi, 2005),
and is also similar to other experiences in Brazil (Avritzer, 2006). This appears to
be a rather small amount, but compared with other participatory processes that
seek to influence the decision-making process, it is a significant figure. However,
numbers tell us little about participation and inclusion.
In general, socio-demographic profile matters. More men, adults, and educated
people participate than women, young, or less educated individuals. However, in
participatory budgets with 6 years or more of experience, women are in the
majority (52.8%) compared with 44% in participatory budgets of only 2 years of
duration. However, in the teams or structures of participatory budgets formed to
administer the process, men form the majority. This is a very similar phenomenon
to that observed in the world of associations (Montero et al., 2006). In proportion to
the population, very few young people take part compared with young adults
(30–44 years old), as is also true for traditional forms of participation (Verba et al.,
1995; Dalton, 2000; Ferrer et al., 2006). Figure 1 shows the differences between the
total number of participants in PB and the average population structure of our
municipalities. Younger people are under-represented, whereas adults aged between
30 and 60 years are over-represented. If we take into account their level of education
(Figure 2), individuals with secondary or university education are over-represented
in the participatory budgets in relation to the population in municipalities, a
phenomenon repeated in participatory processes involving protest.
However, participation data provide us with a static picture. If we take into
account first-time participants and those who have taken part more than once, we
get an idea of the population replacement of the participants, which may allow us
to speak of the evolution of the participatory process. In this case, we see that
among new participants, young people represent a proportion similar to that of
adults, especially those aged between 45 and 59 years. This may allow us to speak
of a replacement of participants by younger population cohorts.
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Politically, it is interesting to learn of these participants’ previous involvement
and their attitudes related to political matters. Studies conducted to date show
that the individuals who participate most in associations or protests are those
who already have a background of participation or a prior interest in politics (van
Deth and Elff, 2004; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2009), as indicated by three
variables: level of involvement with associations, interest in politics, and the
ideological self-description of the participants.
In the analysis, we distinguish between those who belong to a political party, to a
neighbourhood or social association, or any other type of association. If we combine
Figure 1 Differences between the demographic structures of cities and participatory
budgeting participants.
Figure 2 Level of education among the participatory budgeting participants and the
municipality population.
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all types of collectives, the result shows that, for all the municipalities studied, 74.1%
of those who attend PB assemblies belong to some type of association. Unfortunately,
there are no data on associative involvement for each municipality, but by way of
illustration, the number of people who belong to associations in PB is double that of
the same group in relation to the total population of Spain, which is approximately
40% (Montero et al., 2006; Figure 3).
The proportion of the population in the participatory budget best predicts the
levels of association membership. The percentage of association members in
relation to the total number of participants exceeds 80% in municipalities where
less than 1% of the population has been mobilized, whereas in those where more
than 1% have been mobilized, the percentage of association members falls to
68%. The budget exercises that have been running for longer are also those with
a greater proportion of participants who belong to associations. Thus, we can
conclude that the growth of PB clearly stems from the associative sector, which
acts as a catalyst for the influx of people into the assemblies. Although the
methodology is aimed at the entire population, the role played by associations is
fundamental. Most participants also show a strong interest in politics (between
70% and 80% of participants express great or moderate interest in politics).
Citizens who attend PB meetings show a markedly greater interest in politics
(almost 50%) than the general citizenry as recorded in a Spanish survey (CIS,
2007) where 7.5% responded they were interested in politics.
With respect to the participants’ ideological profiles, the survey data indicate that
the bias is very significant. On a scale of 0–10, where 0 represents the extreme left
and 10 the extreme right, the average for participants in the participatory budget is
3.71. This average does not vary significantly in terms of gender, age, or level of
education. We cannot compare the ideological alignment of participants with those
of the general population of each locality, but we can make an approximation based
on the relation between ideological orientation and the voting memory of the par-
ticipants, relating this to how the different parties are represented in each town hall.
Figure 3 Membership of organizations among the participatory budgeting participants.
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The most general result of this analysis reveals a marked ideological bias among
participants in favour of the governing party. For example, in municipalities where the
social democrats (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, PSOE) form the governing party, it
is over-represented, with the exception of one municipality (Terrassa) where we find a
governmental coalition of social democrats with the nationalist left. However, in
municipalities where post-communists govern (United Left, IU), PSOE sympathizers
are under-represented. A similar situation occurs with IU voters when social demo-
crats govern. In the case of the conservative party (People’s Party), we find this party
to be under-represented in all the municipalities except one (Puerto Real), where the
party has a token electoral presence. Broadening the population frame, we find our-
selves in the presence of a population profile that is ideologically skewed to the left.
Although approximately 65% of participants describe themselves as left-wing, in the
case of the Spanish population as a whole this proportion is around 20% lower.
We can find out whether there are variations in ideology if we take into account the
timescales of the different processes. In municipalities with less experience of PB, we
observe that there is an increase in new participants who place themselves in the
ideological centre, whereas a negative change takes place with respect to both left-
wing and right-wing participants, when considering participants with previous
experience of PB. In any case, this is a situation of limited variation. In municipalities
with 3 years’ experience, there is an appreciable ideological renewal in the compo-
sition of new participants as compared with those who have already participated. In
these municipalities, we observe an almost arithmetical replacement in terms of new
participants from the ideological centre, who replace the left-wing participants at a
ratio of almost 1:1. There is also a limited increase in the ratio of right-wing parti-
cipants, a group that tends to consolidate in municipalities with 6 years of PB
experience. These latter budgets represent a relative settling of the ideological com-
position of the people taking part in PB, without manifesting excessive variations
between new and veteran participants. We must take into account that the number of
new participants gradually decreases over time, which indicates that participant
replacement diminishes, although it is true that replacement continues to be quite
high (46% of new participants in budgets running for 6 years, 61% in budgets
running for only 2 years).
In light of these findings, we may speak of PB as a phenomenon, which, in prin-
ciple, agrees with the expectations of participatory dynamism held by people of a
leftist ideology, and who are the protagonists in the first editions of the assembly
process. It also shows to what extent the influence of political parties in government
is important. However, the ideological bias tends to fade with successive PB sessions,
allowing people of a different ideological persuasion to be included.
Deliberative performance within participatory budgets
If inclusion is biased by socio-demographic and socio-political variables, we may
wonder whether participants can be involved on an equal footing in the public
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debate, or whether the same inequalities found in the outside world persist.
Critical political theory has questioned whether all citizens can take part in a
deliberative process on an equal footing (Sanders, 1997; Young, 1997), mainly
because of the intellectual demands of participation in an open debate (Bohman,
1997: 322; Dryzek, 2000: 58). In the following, we shall show to what extent the
deliberative procedure allows influence to be equally distributed in participatory
budgets in the assemblies.
To analyse this question, we shall examine the deliberative performance of the
participants, ranked on a five-point scale ranging from (1) did not participate in or
understand the meeting to (5) made proposals and encouraged others to vote for
them. Table 1 shows the deliberative performance of participants corresponding
to their actions in the assemblies. Each participant may answer any of the possible
responses. In this way, we obtain a deliberative scale of the participants according
to their communicative actions in the public meetings. This deliberative scale
goes a little further than those usually employed to evaluate deliberation in the
Brazilian experiences (Baiocchi, 1999; Avritzer, 2006), which include whether the
participant takes the floor or speaks in public meetings. The data demonstrate that
most participants take part actively in the deliberative process.
Those who take part for the first time in PB take on a less relevant role than
people with experience. Of the total number of participants in the assemblies who
claim not to have understood how the meetings worked, more than 60% are new
(Figure 4). The greater the influence of roles in the assembly, the greater the
percentage of experienced participants who perform them. This fact is not at all
counterintuitive. It is logical that people who have been attending participatory
budgets for years should have a better understanding of the meetings. Therefore,
the results indicate something that was to be expected: that PB, although it is open
to any citizen, still requires detailed knowledge of its workings if the aim of
participants is to maximize their chances of influencing the decisions taken. Even
so, it is still remarkable that there is a percentage, albeit small, of first-time
attendees who claimed not to understand how PB works. Moreover, participatory
budgets with a longer duration have a higher percentage of participants who
claimed not to have understood how the assemblies worked, a category com-
prising both new and veteran participants. In budgets that have run for only 2 years,
Table 1. Participants’ deliberative performance
I went to the meeting but I did not understand it 6.3%
I understood how it works, but I did not make proposals 7.8%
I voted for proposals made by others 27.6%
I made proposals and I voted 36.5%
I made proposals, I voted, and I encouraged others to vote 21.8%
N5 946.
Source: Institute of Advanced Social Studies, E-0705.
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3.7% of participants fall into this category, whereas in budgets with 6 years
experience behind them, this percentage rises to 8%. This may mean that, in
addition to participants needing to know something about the way the delib-
erative process works, the gradual refinement of the process through successive
modifications seems to produce an assembly dynamic that is ever more sophisti-
cated and which, to some extent, makes active citizens’ involvement slightly more
difficult, at least for some.
The people most involved in deliberation (the citizens who are most proactive
and dynamic) hold political attitudes, which we may consider ‘classic’ in terms of the
theory of participation: they are interested in politics, they frequently comment on or
discuss politics with other people and, finally, they work with other citizens in the
neighbourhood to resolve problems. In principle, this result would be contrary to
the hypothesis according to which actively participating individuals have a less
deliberative profile. However, we must take into account that most participants have
a prior participatory profile, therefore, the results may indicate something else.
For example, in a deliberative scenario, those with an active profile also, a priori,
deliberate (Nylen, 2002). This does not necessarily mean that citizens who do not
participate in associations are mere spectators. Four out of five participants who do
not belong to associations carry out some type of activity in the assemblies: voting,
making proposals of their own, or encouraging others to support their ideas.
In Figure 5, we can observe the level of deliberation attained by those who
declare themselves to be active members of an organization and those who say
they do not belong to any public organization. The contrast between the beha-
viour of each is significant. The more deliberative profile (people who make
proposals and vote, and also encourage others to vote for proposals) corresponds
to participants who belong to any organization. Among these, 61.7% have a high
deliberative profile, whereas among the non-members, this percentage is only 45%.
Figure 4 Participants’ deliberative profile in participatory budgeting (PB) meetings and
participants’ experience in PB.
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Four out of five participants who do not belong to associations carry out some type
of activity in the assemblies: voting, making proposals of their own, or encouraging
others to support their ideas.
In contrast, if ideology is a factor that appreciably affects the composition of
those who attend the assemblies, this is not the case for deliberation. Ideological
self-description does not significantly influence the deliberative action of partici-
pants in public meetings. This suggests that the deliberative procedure does not
represent an obstacle to settling differences. Apart from political attitudes, socio-
demographic profile does not matter at all. It is true, on the other hand, that men
and women do not participate in the same way in public meetings. In activities
with greater influence, those where participants make proposals and encourage
others to support them, we find a higher incidence of men; however, women still
play a significant deliberative role in terms of making proposals of their own.
Almost half of the participants with a high deliberative profile are women.
However, it must be emphasized that here we are speaking about the public
assemblies. If we take into account the presence of men and women in partici-
patory budget councils, we would find a significant quantitative difference.
Although women represent almost half of those who attend the assemblies, in the
councils they do not usually exceed 25% of attendees in cities such as Cordoba. In
contrast, the age of participants does not seem to be crucial for inferring their
behaviour in the assemblies. Young people, adults, and older citizens are dis-
tributed in a similar way in terms of their deliberative action. The same is true
with regard to participants’ level of education (Figure 6), which has no significant
influence on deliberative action in the assemblies. There are more people with
lower levels of education who did not understand the meetings, and those with
higher levels of education do adopt a slightly higher deliberative profile, although
the differences have very little significance.
Figure 5 Participants’ deliberative profile in participatory budgeting meetings and association
members.
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Deliberative governance: is it possible?
The way in which the inclusion of the public is ensured by PB has an undeniable
bias in Spain, and the organization of the experience by governments significantly
influences the ideological profile of the participants. In contrast, deliberation
procedures seem to offer a more open public space for debate to some extent, and
they allow citizens to make effective use of their deliberative opportunities
(Bohman, 1997: 345) Table 2 shows the influence of the studied variables on
citizens’ attendance in participatory budgets. Given that the survey is of subjects
who have participated, it is not possible to provide a statistical analysis as such.
The level of influence has been evaluated on the basis of a comparison with the
data provided by censuses for some variables (gender, age, level of studies), or
with secondary data from other surveys carried out on the population in general.
Comparison with these data tells us that all the variables have a more or less strong
influence on the attendance of participants at the public meetings. Table 3, on the
other hand, shows the influence of these variables at the level of the deliberation of
individuals in the assemblies. To determine this influence, a multiple regression
analysis was carried out using the deliberative performance of individuals in the
assemblies as a dependent variable. Of the seven variables considered, four have
statistical significance for predicting variance in the level of deliberation, with the
best predictors being interest in politics and experience in the process. However, we
may say that neither the socio-demographic variables (gender and studies) nor
ideology tell us anything about variance in participants’ deliberative capacities.
The study raises some questions concerning deliberative governance. On the
one hand, the inclusion of citizens does not take place, or at least not at the same
level as in Brazil (Fedozzi, 2005; Avritzer, 2006). Participation in Spain displays
two important biases: first, the profile of participants is similar to the profile of
Figure 6 Participants’ deliberative profile in participatory budgeting meetings and participants’
education.
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those who already participate, as Nylen (2002) showed for Brazilian cases,
although it is also true that 25% of the participants are individuals with no
participatory experience. In contrast, the profile of participants is biased towards
the ruling parties. This leads us to question the extent to which administrations
are sufficiently impartial in organizing an inclusive participatory procedure that
involves the plurality of citizens in determining a part of public expenditure. The
access of citizens to these instruments, when there is no prior selection process,
displays limits that reproduce the same biases and inequalities that occur in
traditional participation (associations).
However, the study reveals that, in spite of inequalities in participation, the
new instruments allow participants to develop deliberative skills so that they can
take advantage of their opportunities. In other words, the differences present in
participation are not reproduced within public meetings themselves. Thus, for
example, in spite of being under-represented, conservatives exhibit a deliberative
performance comparable with the most progressive participants. People with
Table 2. Influence of different variables on participation in assemblies





Interest in politics High
Experience in the process Low
Activity in associations High
Table 3. Influence of deliberative variables on the dynamics of the participatory
budget





Interest in politics 0.187***
Experience in the process 0.155***
Activity in associations 0.082*
N5922
R2 corrected5 0.09
Source: Institute of Advanced Social Studies, E-0705.
aThe figures are standardized beta regression coefficients. The levels of significance are as
follows: *P, 0.05; **P, 0.001; ***P, 0.001.
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lower levels of education propose and deliberate in public meetings with the same
intensity as people with more formal education.
We might wonder, aside from the political motivations that drive the launch of
participatory budgets, whether these experiments will finally be able to attract
people with different profiles. PB in Spain faces a serious problem of legitimacy.
To address this, it would be necessary to think about how to mobilize citizens and
how to organize the process so as to make the experience attractive not only for
those who already participate, but also for those who might take part if questions
of interest to them were involved. We should not forget the importance of the
effectiveness of deliberative process (Avritzer, 2006) in mobilization. Therefore,
confronting the problem of mobilization means dealing with the organization of
participatory processes. If the aim is diversity and a reduction of inequalities in
participation, we believe different mobilization methods must be considered, but
also different forms of administrative organization that favour the effectiveness
of deliberative processes. In Spain, the PB experiences have a greater number of
participants in general and of new participants in particular. In Malaga, where the
administration uses new technologies to organize the experience through tele-
phone messages and the Internet, more young people participate than in any other
case. In Getafe, where the government carried out around 80% of the proposals
made by citizens throughout 7 years of PB, participation between 2004 and 2011
increased by about 1000% (Ganuza and France´s, 2011).
We cannot stop asking ourselves questions. It is true that a space organized for
deliberation can encourage participants to develop skills and take advantage of their
deliberative opportunities. The problem is not deliberation, but context, as Eliasoph
(1998) argues. The problem is how these spaces are to be organized. Can the
administration really be impartial in organizing these spaces? From our perspective,
this question raises many thorny problems concerning the political culture of each
locus and mainly the effectiveness of deliberative processes. PB is a big challenge for
government, because it offers citizens a transparent way to deal with public resour-
ces. Deliberative governance has an important obstacle to surmount, one on which
much of its legitimacy will depend: is it capable of organizing deliberative political
spaces as transparently and as inclusively as possible so that they approach the ideal
of impartiality? Government is not neutral, so it must demonstrate that decision
processes are impartial, or citizens will not accept the process.
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